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Equity incentive inspires the managerment to operate in accordance with the 
principle of maximising shareholders’ interest and reduce principal-agent problem 
through profit sharing and risk sharing between the managerment and shareholders. 
By 2005, stock holding is the main type of equity incentive, while since 2005, stock 
options becomes the type of equity incentive for management. Findings of this paper 
are (1) Level of manager stock holding in China is very low, while state-owned 
company is lower and having distinct area characteristics, mainly in Beijing and 
south-east China. Regression also shows management stock holding is not a valid way 
to motivate managers in state-owned company. 
(2) Company growth opportunities and governance effect of manager stock 
holding are positive correlated. The incentive effect of Non-State-owned holding 
enterprises is better than that of state-owned enterprises. Other factors include salary, 
cashflow, fixed asset and equity distribution. 
(3) Manager stock holding and company performance are endogenous. Manager 
stock holding is motivated to improve cash liquidity and performance, while the 
incentive can turn into more equity. 
(4) After 2005, adjusted rate of return on equity of samples is greater than zero, 
but long-term incentive effect is not obvious. Different industries have distinct 
incentive effects, while manufacturing, information technology and real estate 
industry is weak.  
(5) Paied research shows incentive group have significant higher ROE, however 
we can not find evidence that incentive can neither significantly reduce angency cost 
nor significantly motive invest activities. While stock options have incentive effects 
only during its valid perod, ROE of termination group and match group is not 
significantly diferent during termination period. 
 
Accordingly, the paper puts forward appropriate recommendations for executive 
incentive from perspective of information disclosure, corporate governance, reform of 
state-owned enterprises and operations of equity incentive program. 
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机制有两种假说，一种是 Jensen 和 Meckling（1976）[3]提出的“利益一致性假说”，
即股权激励具有协同效应，有助于促使高管与外部股东的利益趋同，并能有效地











































流行的方式。从 2005 年到 2008 年，已有 120 家公司发布股权激励草案，其一度
亦受到管理层和投资者的追捧。然而诸如宝钢股份、中集集团等公司的股权激励
方案均先后夭折。本文需要回答的第二个问题是经营者持股激励和股票期权激






                                                      































































和 Panel Fixed Effect 和 Panel Random Effect。4.4.2 节公司业绩与经营者持股的内
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